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Abstract. The Logic of Proofs, LP, is an explicit provability logic due
to Artemov. The introduction of LP answered a long-standing question
concerning the intended semantics of Go¨del’s provability calculus and
provability semantics for intuitionistic logic. The explicit nature of LP
and its ability to naturally represent both modal logic and typed λ-
calculi, especially in light of the Curry-Howard Isomorphism, makes its
applicability to Computer Science a primary focus of research in this
area. In the present paper, I develop a tableau system for LP and give
a semantic proof of cut elimination.
1 Introduction
Artemov’s Logic of Proofs, LP, provides Go¨del’s intended connection between
intuitionistic logic and classical proofs by combining propositions and proofs
into the same calculus of proof-carrying formulas while retaining an appropriate
provability semantics [1]. Proof terms in LP, called proof polynomials, are given
an explicit provability reading: “t : X ,” where t is a proof term and X is a
formula, is read as, “t is a proof of X .”
LP naturally subsumes both modal logic and typed λ-calculi ([1]) in that it
can code proofs and programs in a single system. In light of the Curry-Howard
Isomorphism, this combination of modal iteration with the explicit character of
λ-terms indicates the importance of LP in Computer Science (see Artemov’s
keynote addresses for CLS’03 and ESSLLI’03 [2, 3]).
After recounting the Hilbert-style theory of LP, I will present a tableau proof
system for LP in the style of Smullyan (see [4]). I will show that this tableau
system is sound and complete with respect to a natural semantics for LP that
was developed by Mkrtychev in [5] (a survey of Mkrtchev’s models, known as
M-models, can be found in [6]). The semantic proof of completeness will also
yield cut elimination in LP tableaux.
As Smullyan observes in [4], certain Gentzen-style theories are closely related
to tableaux (and vice versa), and LP tableaux will share such a relationship with
Artemov’s cut-free Gentzen-style theory of LP, LPG− (see [1]). Similarly, LP
tableaux with cut are related to the Gentzen-style theory with cut, LPG. Cut
2elimination for LP tableaux then implies admissibility of cut in LPG−, so cut
can be eliminated from LPG.
Using syntactic methods, cut elimination for a fragment of LPG was estab-
lished in [1], where cut elimination for the whole of LPG was stated with only
a brief outline of a proof. The current paper provides the first detailed proof of
cut elimination in LP.
2 The logic and its tableau system
2.1 Syntax
The “modals” in LP are called terms and are built up inductively from the
atomic terms: proof constants ci and proof variables xi, where i ∈ N.
Definition 1 (Terms). For each i ∈ N, both ci and xi are atomic terms. If t
and s are terms, then so is each of (t + s), (!t), and (t · s). Let T denote the set
of LP terms.
Formulas in LP are built up from propositional variables Ai, where i ∈ N,
and the absurdity constant ⊥ in the usual way using implication →. Modal-like
formulas are introduced by combining a formula X and a term t to produce t :X .
Definition 2 (Formulas). ⊥ is a formula. For each i ∈ N, Ai is a formula.
Whenever X and Y are formulas and t is a term, both (X → Y ) and (t :X) are
formulas. Let F denote the set of LP formulas.
Definition 3 (LP). The axioms of LP are:
1. Finite set of axiom schemes for classical logic using → and ⊥
2. t :X → X, “reflection”
3. t : (X → Y ) → (s :X → (t · s) :Y ), “application”
4. t :X →!t : (t :X), “proof checking”
5. ti :X → (t0 + t1) :X, where i ∈ {0, 1}, “sum”
The rules of inference of LP are modus ponens and constant necessitation: from
any axiom A, infer ci :A, where i ∈ N.
2.2 Semantics
Mkrtychev showed in [5] that the Hilbert-style theory presented above is sound
and complete with respect to his semantics. This semantics assigns to each term
t a set of formulas ∗(t), which may be finite, infinite, or empty. In an M-model,
X ∈ ∗(t) will be taken to mean that t :X holds. To satisfy reflection, M-models
also require that whenever X ∈ ∗(t) in a model then X will also hold in the
model. The function ∗ is called a proof-theorem assignment.
Definition 4. A proof-theorem assignment is a map ∗ : T → 2F satisfying:
31. (X → Y ) ∈ ∗(t) and X ∈ ∗(s) implies Y ∈ ∗(t · s)
2. ∗(t) ∪ ∗(s) ⊆ ∗(t + s)
3. X ∈ ∗(t) implies (t :X) ∈ ∗(!t)
Since there are no restrictions on the formulas that may be assigned to proof
variables xi, it is evident that the terms xi intuitively serve as variables, since,
in a given proof, each xi can be taken to prove any desired set of formulas. Proof
constants ci similarly have little restriction, though for the moment it will be
most instructive to consider them as labels of axioms.
It is also already apparent that a term produced from atomic terms using +,
·, and ! encodes (in some sense) a particular proof that makes use of the facts
represented by the atomic terms. In particular, if a compound term t is built up
from proof constants c1, . . . , cn and proof variables x1, . . . , xm, then t encodes
some proof involving the axioms encoded in c1, . . . , cn and the assumptions en-
coded in x1, . . . , xm. This proof is evidence for those formulas contained in ∗(t).
For an explicit description of an arithmetical encoding of proofs and how this
brings about an arithmetic semantics for LP, see [1].
Definition 5. A pre-model is a pair M = (v, ∗), where v is a truth assignment
to the propositional variables Ai. The pair uniquely determines the usual one-
place semantic forcing relation M on LP formulas satisfying:
1. 2M ⊥
2. M Ai iff v(Ai) is true, for Ai a propositional variable
3. M X → Y iff 2M X or M Y
4. M t :X iff X ∈ ∗(t)
Definition 6. A pre-model M is reflexive if X ∈ ∗(t) implies M X.
Definition 7. A model is a reflexive pre-model.
Definition 8. X is true in a (pre-)model M when M X. If for every model
M it is the case that M X, then X is valid.
Definition 9. A constant specification is a set CS of formulas of the form
ci : A, where i ∈ N and A is an LP axiom. An LP model M is said to be a
CS-model if for every X ∈ CS, M X.
Definition 9 describes the sense in which LP models are relativized to a
particular set of named axioms, where a proof constant serves as a name of a
particular axiom. When it is important to highlight the fact that the theory is
relativized to a particular constant specification CS, I will denote the theory by
LPCS .
2.3 Tableaux
The tableau method of proof is really a search for a countermodel. A tableau itself
is a tree whose nodes are labeled by formulas adjoined with some bookkeeping
4convention on labels to determine whether the search considers a formula true.1
To this end, I will prefix formulas by either T or F. Given a tableau, it is the
intention that, under suitable conditions, a branch in the tree—that is, a path
from the root to a leaf—corresponds to a model that makes those T-prefixed
formulas occurring on the branch true and those with an F-prefix false.
A branch fails to be a countermodel when that branch cannot represent a
model. This occurs when the branch is closed, which means it is contradictory
in that it contains both TX and FX for some X or it contains T⊥.
A tableau search for a model of a finite set S of prefixed formulas begins with
the construction of a linear tree whose nodes consist of the formulas in S. This
is an initial tableau, called the tableau beginning with S. Then, given a tableau
τ , when a prefixed formula at a node n in the tree has the structure of one of
the tableau rules, I may apply the rule to produce a larger tree. This larger tree
is also called a tableau: it is the tableau generated or produced from τ . Using
an extension of the notation of Smullyan (see [4]), LP tableau rules are of the
type α, β, or βX . Let m be any leaf node occurring on a branch containing n.
In the α case, either of the prefixed formulas α1 or α2 may be attached as a
child of m to produce another tableau (though it is typically the case that one is
attached as a child of m and the other is attached as a child of the first). In the β
case, both prefixed formulas β1 and β2 are attached as children of m to produce
another tableau. The βX case is similar to the β case.2 See Fig. 1 for a graphic
representation of the α, β, and βX rules. These rules are applied successively
until all branches are closed or until application of a rule fails to add any new
nodes to a branch. To prove X , I set S = {FX}.
α1
α2
α
β2β1
β βX
βX2β
X
1
Fig. 1. Definition of the α, β, and βX rules
1 Note that I will often use a node’s label as its name, even though a tableau may
have different nodes with the same label. In this case, fixing any specific node with
this name for the duration of the discussion is sufficient to avoid ambiguity. This is
because any node with the specified name will do during such discussions, as long
as the node remains fixed.
2 Note that the α, β, and βX formulas need not occur at leaves, as n is taken anywhere
in the tree.
5The α, β, and βX formulas, whose rules were mentioned immediately above,
are defined in Fig. 2. The βX rule for products of terms has a parameter X ,
which indicates what is to be the antecedent of the implication in the β1 case.
X can be any LP formula.
α α1 α2
FX → Y TX FY
F(s + t) :X Fs :X Ft :X
Tt :X TX TX
F!t : (t :X) Ft :X Ft :X
And, if ci :A ∈ CS,
α α1 α2
Fci :A FA FA
β β1 β2
TX → Y FX TY
βX βX1 β
X
2
F(s · t) :Y Fs : (X → Y ) Ft :X
Fig. 2. Definition of α, β, and βX formulas. Note that the constant rule—the α rule
for prefixed formulas of the form Fci :A—may only be applied when A is an axiom
labeled by ci in the constant specification CS.
The constant rule—the α-rule operating on formulas of the form Fci :A—is
of particular consequence to LP tableaux. Since LP models are relativized to
a particular constant specification CS, tableau search must also be accordingly
relativized. That is, the tableau search for a model requires a constant specifi-
cation CS as a parameter. The CS parameter indicates when the constant rule
may be applied, since the tableau search is to produce an LPCS countermodel.
A branch θ is closed whenever one of the following holds:
1. T⊥ appears on θ
2. For some formula X , both TX and FX appear on θ
A tableau is closed if every branch is closed. If a branch or tableau is not closed,
it is open. For a formula X , a tableau proof of X is a closed tableau beginning
with FX . A branch θ of a tableau is satisfiable if there is a model M such that
M X if TX appears on θ and 2M X if FX appears on θ. A tableau is satisfiable
if one of its branches is satisfiable. The next two lemmas are consequences of the
definition of M-models.
Lemma 1. If a model M satisfies α, then it satisfies both α1 and α2.
6Lemma 2. If a model M satisfies β, then it satisfies β1 or β2. Also, if a model
M satisfies βX , then it satisfies βX1 or β
X
2 .
Example 1. Let the propositional connective ∨ be defined in the usual way as
X ∨ Y := (X → ⊥) → Y . It can be easily verified that the following derived α
and β rules follow for ∨:
α α1 α2
FX ∨ Y FX FY
β β1 β2
TX ∨ Y TX TY
Take the constant specification
CS = {c1 : (x1 :A1 → (x1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2)), c2 : (x2 :A2 → (x1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2))} .
Then, using the derived rules, Fig. 3 is a proof of the formula
(x1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2) → (c1x1 + c2x2) : (x1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2) .
The first branching in the tableau is caused by application of the derived β rule
for ∨, which is applied to Tx1 : A1 ∨ x2 : A2, producing β1 = Tx1 : A1 and
β2 = Tx2 :A2. Below this β2, β
x2:A2 is applied to F(c2x2) : (x1 :A1 ∨x2 :A2). The
antecedent x2 :A2 is chosen because this closes both of the produced branches.
The right branch is closed because it contradicts its parent. Because c2 is indeed
a label of the axiom x2 : A2 → (x1 : A1 ∨ x2 : A2), application of the constant
rule is possible. Since the resulting α is an axiom labeled by F, this branch also
closes (as is shown). The case of the Tx1 :A1-side of the tree is similar.
Since every branch of the tableau closes, there can be no model of any branch,
and hence there can be no model of the root of this tree. Therefore, the formula
I wished to prove cannot be false in a model, and hence the formula holds in
every model.3
2.4 Soundness and Completeness
Together, Lemmas 1 and 2 imply the following corollary, which I will make use
of in the proof of soundness.
Corollary 1. If a tableau τ is satisfiable, then for any tableau τ ′ produced from
τ by application of a tableau rule, τ ′ is also satisfiable.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). If there is a tableau proof of a formula X under a
constant specification CS, then X has a CS-model.
3 Of course these final sentences depend on the forthcoming soundness result.
7⊗
Tx1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2
F(c1 · x1 + c2 · x2) : (x1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2)
F(x1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2) → (c1 · x1 + c2 · x2) : (x1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2)
F(c1 · x1) : (x1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2)
F(c2 · x2) : (x1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2)
Tx1 :A1 Tx2 :A2
Fc1 : (x1 :A1 → (x1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2))
⊗ ⊗
⊗
Fx1 : A1
Fx1 :A1 → (x1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2)
Tx1 :A1
Fx1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2
Fx1 :A1
Fx2 :A2
Fc2 : (x2 :A2 → (x1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2))
Fx2 :A2 → (x1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2)
Tx2 :A2
Fx1 :A1 ∨ x2 :A2
Fx1 :A1
Fx2 :A2
Fx2 :A2
Fig. 3. A tableau proof of the formula in Example 1. The tableau makes use of the
derived ∨ rules. Closed branches are indicated by ⊗.
8Proof. If X does not have a CS-model, then there is a CS-model M such that
2M X . Thus the tableau τ consisting of only FX is satisfiable, for M satisfies it.
But by Corollary 1, every tableau produced from τ is also satisfiable. Therefore
no tableau beginning with FX can close, so there can be no tableau proof of
X . ut
Completeness is proven using a semantic method that makes use of a tableau-
specific notion of consistency and has the look of a Lindenbaum argument. Specif-
ically,
Definition 10. For a finite set S of prefixed LP formulas, S is consistent if no
tableau beginning with S closes. For S an infinite set, S is consistent if every
finite subset is consistent. A set is inconsistent if it is not consistent.
After mentioning the following standard lemma, I will introduce an addi-
tional, related notion that will be technically convenient.
Lemma 3. Every consistent set can be extended to a maximally consistent set.
Definition 11. A set S of prefixed LP formulas is downward saturated when
each of the following holds:
1. S is consistent
2. α1, α2 ∈ S if α ∈ S
3. β1 ∈ S or β2 ∈ S if β ∈ S
4. for every LP formula X, βX1 ∈ S or β
X
2 ∈ S if β
X ∈ S
Lemma 4. Any maximally consistent set is downward saturated.
Proof. By a straight-forward verification of each case. ut
Lemma 5. Suppose a set S is downward saturated. If S∪{FX} is inconsistent,
then there is a closed tableau τ for a finite subset, where τ is produced without
applying any tableau rule to a member of S.
Proof. If S ∪{FX} is inconsistent, there is a finite S ′ ⊆ S such that application
of some tableau rules to the tableau beginning with S ′∪{FX} produces a closed
tableau. I wish to show that application of a rule to a member of S is unnecessary;
that is, whenever τ is a closed tableau produced from the tableau beginning with
S′ ∪ {FX}, there exists a closed tableau τ ′ such that fewer rules are applied to
members of S in τ ′ than in τ ′. τ ′ will be constructed from τ , so well-ordering
of the naturals combined with the fact that the result holds when no rules are
applied to a member of S implies the overall result.
If no rule was applied to a member of S in τ , then I am done. So assume
that some rule is applied to a member of S in τ . I must then consider each of
the cases α, β, and βX , though the β and βX cases are the same.
In the α case, I can take S1 := S
′ ∪ {α1, α2} and consider τ
′ as the tableau
beginning with S1 ∪ {FX}, which then has one less tableau rule applied to a
member of S than does τ .
9In the βX case, where X is some LP formula, since S ′∪{FX} is inconsistent,
both the tableau beginning with S ′ ∪{FX, βX1 } and the tableau beginning with
S′ ∪ {FX, βX2 } close. Let S1 := S
′ ∪ {βX1 } and S2 := S
′ ∪ {βX2 }; both S1 and
S2 are finite. S is downward saturated, so β
X
1 ∈ S or β
X
2 ∈ S, and since S is
also consistent, S1 or S2 is consistent. For concreteness, take β
X
1 ∈ S. Notice
that the βX rule need not be applied, for let τ ′ the tableau that results from
trimming off the βX2 subtree of τ , and thus τ
′ is a closed tableau beginning with
S1 ∪ {FX} that has fewer rules applied to a member of S than does τ . The β
case is handled similarly. ut
Theorem 2 (Completeness). If X has a CS-model, then X has a tableau
proof.
Proof. Suppose X has no tableau proof. Then the set {FX} is consistent and,
by Lemma 3, can be extended to a maximally consistent set S. By Lemma 4, S
is downward saturated.
I will construct a CS-model M so that if TY ∈ S then M Y and if FY ∈ S
then 2M Y , which yields the result, since FX ∈ S. To specify the model M =
(v, ∗), I must specify v and ∗. Set v(Ai) true if and only if TAi ∈ S, where Ai
is a propositional variable. For any proof term t, let ∗(t) = {X | Ft :X /∈ S}. ∗
satisfies the properties of a proof-theorem assignment:
1. Assume that (Y → Z) ∈ ∗(t) and Y ∈ ∗(s). This means Ft : (Y → Z) /∈ S
and Fs : Y /∈ S. S is downward saturated, so it cannot be the case that
F(t · s) :Z ∈ S. So, Z ∈ ∗(t · s).
2. Assume that Y ∈ ∗(t) or Y ∈ ∗(s). This means Ft :Y /∈ S or Fs :Y /∈ S. S
is downward saturated, so it cannot be the case that F(t + s) : Y ∈ S. So,
(t + s) :Y ∈ S.
3. Assume that t :Y ∈ ∗(t). This means Ft :Y /∈ S. S is downward saturated,
so it cannot be the case that F!t : (t :Y ) ∈ S. So, (t :Y ) ∈ ∗(!t).
Thus, M is a pre-model. Notice that M also satisfies each formula in CS, since
every member of CS is an axiom labeled by a proof constant.
I now wish to show by induction on the complexity of the formula Y that
TY ∈ S implies M Y and FY ∈ S implies 2M Y for M . In the base case, Y is
atomic and is thus either Ai or ⊥. The former case is satisfied by definition of v
and the latter can only occur when F⊥ ∈ S, which M trivially satisfies. I now
assume that the result holds for formulas of complexity less than Y and prove
it also holds for Y . Each case is considered separately:
1. Y is W → Z.
(a) TW → Z ∈ S implies FW ∈ S or TZ ∈ S since S is downward
saturated. By the inductive hypothesis, 2M W or M Z, and thus
M W → Z by definition.
(b) If FW → Z ∈ S, then TW ∈ S and FZ ∈ S by downward saturation.
By the inductive hypothesis, M W and 2M Z, and thus 2M W → Z
by definition.
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2. Y is t :Z.
(a) Tt :Z ∈ S implies Ft :Z /∈ S, since S is consistent. Thus, Z ∈ ∗(t) and
M t :Z.
(b) If Ft :Z ∈ S, by definition of the proof-theorem assignment ∗, Z /∈ ∗(t).
Therefore, 2M t :Z.
Hence the result holds for all formulas Y .
What now remains is to show that the pre-model M is in fact a model, which
will complete the proof. That is, I must show
Y ∈ ∗(t) implies M Y . (1)
I will show this by induction on the complexity of t. Recall that Y ∈ ∗(t) is
equivalent to saying Ft :Y /∈ S.
In the base case of this induction, t is atomic and is thus either ci or xi. In
the former case, the maximal consistency of S implies that if Fci : Y /∈ S then
S ∪ {Fci :Y } is inconsistent. By Lemma 5, there is a closed tableau for a finite
subset without applying any rules to a member of S. There are two subcases:
– If ci :Y ∈ CS, then Y is an axiom A. But every axiom is true in every model
and thus M A.
– If ci :Y /∈ CS, no tableau rule applies, so it must be the case that Tci :Y ∈ S.
Since S is downward saturated, TY ∈ S, and I have already shown that this
implies M Y .
The case for which t is the atomic term xi is the same as the second subcase
above.
I now assume that the property (1) holds of all terms s of complexity less than
t and show it also holds for t. By the maximal consistency of S, if Ft : Y /∈ S,
then S ∪ {Ft : Y } is inconsistent. If Tt : Y ∈ S, then downward saturation
implies TY ∈ S and hence M Y by what I have already shown. So assume
that Tt :Y /∈ S. By Lemma 5, there exists a closed tableau τ for a finite subset
of S ∪ {Ft :Y } without applying any rule to a member of S. If no tableau rule
applies to a formula of the form Ft :Y , then it must be the case that Tt :Y ∈ S,
which was already handled. So assume some tableau rule applies to Ft :Y .
– If this rule is an α, then since Tt :Y /∈ S and τ is closed, S ∪ {α1, α2} must
also be inconsistent. So α1, α2 /∈ S. But each αi is of the form Fs : Y for
some term s of less complexity than t and hence, by the inductive hypothesis,
M Y .
– If this rule is a β, then since Tt :Y /∈ S and τ is closed, S ∪{β1} or S ∪{β2}
must also be inconsistent. So β1 /∈ S or β2 /∈ S. But each βi is of the form
Fs :Y for some term s of less complexity than t and since at least one βi /∈ S,
the inductive hypothesis implies M Y .
– The βX case is the same as the β case.
Hence Equation 1 holds of all terms t and all formulas Y .
So, I have shown that M is indeed a CS-model (of {FX}) and thus the proof
is complete. ut
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2.5 Cut elimination
In tableaux, the cut rule allows a new tableau to be produced from any existing
tableau by choosing any leaf node m and adding both TX and FX as children
of m, where X is some LP formula; see Fig. 4. The following corollary is a
result originally proved by Artemov via syntactic methods [1]. Tableaux give an
alternative proof.
FXTX
Fig. 4. The cut rule
Corollary 2. Cut is an admissible rule.
Proof. Cut is clearly a sound rule. However, anything that is provable with cut
is also provable without, since tableaux without cut are complete. ut
LPG is the Gentzen-style system describing LP, and LPG− is LPG without
the Gentzen cut rule. LPG− and the present tableau system are related in the
sense described by Smullyan in Chapter XI of his book [4]. In particular, any
tableau proof can be converted to a block tableau proof, which can be converted
to a derivation in LPG−. The converse also holds, as this argument is invertible.
Thus, LPG− is sufficient to capture all of LP (equivalently, all of LPG).
2.6 Tableaux for weaker systems
In Fitting’s Kripke-style semantics for LP (see [7]), LP terms are considered as
possible evidence for the formulas to which they are attached; that is, “t : F”
is read, “t is an evidence for F .” In a system strong enough to internalize its
own proofs, a proof is a rather demanding form of evidence. It may be the case
that such a high degree of reflection requires too much in some applications. In
these cases, sublogics of LP that describe weaker notions of evidence may be
more appropriate. Any such sublogic has its own tableau system, which is found
by considering only those α, β, and βX rules that correspond to the particular
sublogic.
Example 2. The sublogic of LP that does not use + can be considered a quasi-
single-conclusion sublogic, in that the multiplicity of formulas for which a term
is evidence is dictated by the constant specification; this is because evidences
cannot be disjunctively combined: given terms t and s, I cannot combine them
to produce a term u that is evidence for those statements for which either t or
s is evidence. The tableau system for this logic is the same as that presented
above, sans the α rule for + in terms.
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